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The Problem of Multiple Inheritance
Taxes on Intangible Property
By BERTON T. GOBBLE*
At the last annual meeting of the National Tax Association, held
at St. Paul October 13-16, 1941, Marriner S. Eccles, chairman of the
board of governors of the Federal Reserve System, in an address to
members of the association stated that "If we are to make progressive
taxes the major element of our national tax structure, it will not be
possible to continue the present system of having both the states and
the federal government levy taxes on corporate and individual incomes
and transfers at death."' In other words Mr. Eccles proposed that the
right to levy taxes on income, gifts and bequests should be restricted
wholly to the federal government which in turn would redistribute a
share of such revenues to the several states. One of the main threats
of such federal encroachment on the right of taxation by states was the
fact that more than one state might constitutionally tax the transfer
of intangible personal property of a decedent. This proposal was made
before the Supreme Court of the United States handed down its mo-
mentous decision in the case of State Tax Commission of Utah v.
Aldrich and Harkness, Administrators, on April 27, 1942.-'
In the Aldrich case the majority opinion was written by Justice
Douglas, and Justice Jackson wrote the dissenting opinion. The de-
cedent, Edward S. Harkness, died a resident of New York. Among
the assets of his estate were 10,000 shares of common stock and 400
shares of preferred stock of the Union Pacific Railroad Company. The
certificates for such shares of stock were at all times actually in the state
of New York. For many years the company had kept its stock books
and records and transfer' agents in New York and had not maintained
any in Utah. The sole basis for the levy of a death tax on such shares
of stock by the state of Utah was by reason of the fact that the Union
Pacific Railroad Company was incorporated under the laws of Utah.
The question had been squarely presented to the court some years before
in the case of First National Bank v. Maine.," and the court had held
that the state of Maine could not do precisely what the state of Utah
was here attempting to do. Therefore, in order to sustain the tax the
court had to overrule the prior case. This the court did in no uncertain
*Of the Denver Bar, Assistant Attorney General and Inheritance Tax Commis-
sioner. An address given before the Colorado Bar Association in Colorado Springs
on September 18, 1942.
'Proceedings of Thirty-fourth National Conference (1941) of the National
Tax Association 336-337.
262 Sup. Ct. 1008. 86 L. ed. 911 (1942).
3284 U. S. 312, 52 S. Ct. 174, 76 L. ed. 313 (1932).
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terms, establishing once again the authority for more than one state
to levy a succession tax on the same intangible property. By per-
mitting the company to incorporate under its laws, Utah had bestowed
a benefit for which it could ask a return. And that return could be in
the form of a succession tax on the right to transfer such shares of stock
to the legatees under the decedent's will. But the thing that really hurt
was the fact that in the Aldrich case the state of New York had a statute
permitting a credit against the estate tax imposed by New York of the
amount of any constitutionally valid estate or inheritance tax paid to
any other state within three years after the decedent's death. The effect
of the case, therefore, was to permit Utah to levy a tax which had to
be borne by New York.
Justice Jackson, in his dissenting opinion, indicated the effect the
new decision would have on the tax program of the several states when
he said:
"The new tax we have authorized undermines the principle
of graduation of tax burdens in proportion to ability to pay. No
tax laid on anything less than the total net worth of the estate
can be graduated even roughly according to the principle which
progressive modern taxation strives to heed. The imposition of
unpredictable assessments from many sources makes it impossible
for the state of domicile to make intelligent use of its own taxing
power as an instrument of enlightened social policy. Chaos serves
no social end."
In line with the philosophy of Marriner Eccles, Justice Jackson
advanced the fear of many state tax administrators when he stated,
"I do not doubt that today's decision will give a new impetus to
federal absorption of this revenue source and to federal incorporation
of large enterprises. * * * With confidence we may anticipate that this
decision will produce much confusion, some controversy between the
states, and a lusty crop of litigation."
Justice Jackson went on to comment as to the probable effect the
decision would have on other tax decisions of the Supreme Court:
"Certain it is that while only corporate stock is expressly
mentioned in the opinion or involved in the judgment today, the
fiction of benefits and protection is capable of as ready adaptabil-
ity to other intangible property. Our tomorrows will witness
an extension of the taxing power of the chartering or issuing
state to corporate bonds and bonds of states and municipalities
(by overruling Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.
S. 204), to bank credits for cash deposited (by overruling Bald-
tw'in v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586) and to choses in action (by over-
ruling Beidler v. South Carolina, 228 U. S. 1). And while today
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the Court sustains only a death transfer tax, its theories are equally
serviceable to sustain an income or excise tax on dividends from
such stock or interest on bonds or a sales tax, or a gift tax. * * *
I therefore take today's decision to mean that any state may lay
substantially any tax on any transfer of intangible property to-
ward which it can spell out a conceivable legal relationship.
"And since the Due Process Clause speaks with no more
clarity as to tangible than as to intangible property, the question
is opened whether our decisions as to taxation of tangible property
are not due to be overhauled."
Justice Roberts concurred in the dissenting opinion of Justice
Jackson.
Prior to 1930 many states had been taxing the transfer of in-
tangible property of non-residents. Colorado had a provision in its
1921 law which permitted the assessment of such a tax. 4  Such state
laws were not unconstitutional in view of Blackstone v. Miller5
which had "rejected the notion that there were constitutional objections
to double taxation of intangibles by states which had command over
them or their owner."
Commencing with the case of Blodgett v. Silberman7 the United
States Supreme Court handed down a series of decisions which estab-
lished the single death tax theory fixed in the state of domicile. Blodgett
v. Silberman had held that bonds and certificates of stocks located in
safety deposit boxes in another state were nevertheless intangible prop-
erty and subject to tax in the state of decedent's domicile.
In 1930 the court decided Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Minne-
sota," which overruled Blackstone v. Miller, and held that bonds issued
by a state and certificates of indebtedness of cities within the state are
not subject to the state inheritance tax when owned by a non-resident
decedent and located without the state. In that same year the court
held in Baldwin v. MissouriO that a state may not impose a transfer or
inheritance tax upon such intangible personal property owned by a
non-resident as credits for cash deposited in local banks, coupon bonds
issued by the United States, and promissory notes constituting debts
from residents to non-residents, the bonds and notes being physically
present in the state, but not having obtained a business situs there.
Later that same year in Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Commission,1o
'Sec. 2 B. Ch. 144, Laws 1921, p. 410: "B. When the transfer is by will or
intestate laws of property within the State and the decedent was a non-resident of
the State at the time of his death."
5188 U. S. 189, 23 S. Ct. 277, 47 L. ed. 439 (1903).
'Justice Jackson in the Aldrich decision supra note 2.
1277 U, S. 1. 48 S. Ct. 410. 72 L. ed. 749 (1928).
1280 U. S. 204. 50 S. Ct. 98. 74 L. ed. 371. 65. A.L.R. 1000 (1930).
"281 U. S. 586, 50 S. Ct. 436, 74 L. ed. 1056, 72 A.L.R. 1303 (1930).1282 U. S. 1, 51 S. Ct. 54, 75 L. ed. 131 (1930).
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the court ruled that a state may not levy an inheritance tax upon the
intangible assets of a non-resident estate consisting of indebtedness
for advances and unpaid dividends owed the non-resident estate by a
domestic corporation. The assertion that the indebtedness had a busi-
ness situs within the taxing state must be supported by evidence and that
requirement is not met by a mere showing that the indebtedness was an
open unsecured account or that the non-resident decedent was the
chief stockholder and largely interested in the company's affairs. In
1932 the court took just the opposite position from the Aldrich decision
and held in First National Bank v. Maine" that shares of stock, like
other intangibles, constitutionally can be subjected to a death transfer
tax by one state only-the state of domicile.
On May 29, 1939, the Supreme Court decided Curry v. Mc-
Canless,12 which definitely upset the single tax theory based solely upon
the decedent's domicile. In this case the decedent, a resident of Ten-
nessee, had transferred certain intangible property to a trustee in Ala-
bama. Under the terms of the trust agreement the decedent had re-
served a power of appointment over the corpus of the trust. By her
will the decedent bequeathed the trust property to the same trustee in
Alabama. At all times the trust property had an actual situs in
Alabama. Under the will a Tennessee executor was named to ad-
minister the estate located in Tennessee, and an Alabama executor was
named to administer all the estate located in Alabama. The court
held that both Tennessee and Alabama could constitutionally impose
a tax on transfer of the intangibles held by the Alabama trustee but
passing under the will of the decedent, domiciled in Tennessee.
The majority opinion was written by Justice Stone. Justice
Butler wrote the dissenting opinion, concurred in by Chief Justice
Hughes, Justice McReynolds, and Justice Roberts. The court recalled
that
"From the beginning of our constitutional system control
over the person at the place of his domicile and his duty there,
common to all citizens, to contribute to the support of govern-
ment have been deemed to afford an adequate constitutional basis
for imposing on him a tax on the use and enjoyment of rights in
intangibles measured by their value. In cases where the owner of
intangibles confines his activity to the place of his domicile, it has
been found convenient to substitute a rule for a reason, by saying
that his intangibles are taxed at their situs and not elsewhere, or,
perhaps less artificially, by invoking the maxim mobilia sequuntur
personam. But when the tax payer extends his activities with
respect to his intangibles, so as to avail himself of the protection
"284 U. S. 312, 52 S. Ct. 1.74. 76 L. ed. 313, 77 A.L.R. 1401 (1932).
12307 U. S. 357, 59 S. Ct. 900, 83 L. ed. 1339 (1939).
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and benefit of the laws of another state, in such a way as to bring
his person or property within the reach of the tax gatherer there,
the reason ,for a single place of taxation no longer obtains, and
the rule is not even a workable substitute for the reasons which
may exist in any particular case to support the constitutional
power of each state concerned to tax. Since Alabama may law-
fully tax the property in the trustee's hands, the court perceives
no ground for saying that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids
that state to tax the transfer of it or an interest in it to another
merely because the transfer was effected by decedent's testamentary
act in another state. in effecting her purposes, the testatrix brought
some of the legal interests which she created within the control of
one state by selecting a trustee there and others within the con-
trol of the other state by making her domicile there. She neces-
sarily invoked the aid of the law of both states; and her legatees,
before they can secure and enjoy the benefits of succession, must
invoke the law of both."
While Curry v. McCanless' 3 did not expressly overrule any of the
prior decisions of the court adopting the single tax theory, many legal
commentators believed that by inference the cases of Farmers Loan &
Trust Co. v. Minnesota,14 First National Bank v. Maine15 and Wachovia
Bank & Trust Company v. Doughton, 6 the latter case involving the
right of a state to tax the exercise by a resident donee of a power of ap-
pointment created by a non-resident donor, had been overruled. All
agreed that Curry L,. McCanless showed a definite trend which would
permit double taxation of intangibles and in some cases triple taxation.
On that same day the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
GraVes u. Elliott,1 7 the facts of which were that decedent, while domi-
ciled in Colorado, transferred to a Colorado bank certain bonds under
a revocable trust agreement. Afterwards decedent became a resident
of New York and died while domiciled in that state. Following her
death the taxing authorities of Colorado assessed a tax on the trans-
mission at death of the trust fund. The court held that New York also
could constitutionally levy a transfer tax upon the relinquishment at
death of the power of revocation, measured by the value of the in-
tangibles, based upon the authority of Curry v. McCantess. '
After the New York Surrogate Court had handed down a deci-




16272 U. S. 567, 47 S. Ct. 202. 71 L. ed. 413 (1926).
17307 U. S. 383, 59 S. Ct. 913, 83 L. ed. 1356 (1939).
'"Supra note 12.
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not been overruled by Curry v. McCanless, the United States Supreme
Court granted a writ of certiorari in the case of Graves v. Schrnidlapp,'
9
and on March 30, 1942, expressly overruled the Wachovia case. In
the Schmidlapp case decedent had died a resident of New York, where
his will had been probated and letters testamentary issued. Decedent's
father bad previously died a resident of Massachusetts, where his will
had been probated. By his will the father bequeathed his residuary
estate in trust to divide the trust fund into as many shares as be should
leave children surviving. To his son, the New York decedent, he gave
a life estate in one share and a general power to dispose of that share
"by will". By his will decedent appointed his share of the trust fund
to his widow, and the New York tax authorities, in computing the tax,
included in the decedent's gross estate the intangibles bequeathed to
her under the power. The court held that
"For purposes of estate and inheritance taxation the power to
dispose of property at death is the equivalent of ownership. In-
tangibles, which are legal relationships between persons and which
in fact have no geographical location, are so associated with the
owner that they and their transfer at death are taxable at the place
of his domicile where his person and the exercise of his property
rights are subject to the control of the sovereign power. His trans-
fer of interests in intangibles by virtue of the exercise of a donated
power instead of that derived from ownership, stands on the same
footing. In both cases the sovereign's control over his person and
estate at the place of his domicile and his duty to contribute to the
financial support of government there, afford adequate constitu-
tional basis for the imposition of a tax. * * * Wachovia Bank &
Trust Co. u. Doughton, on which respondents rely, denied the
constitutional power of a state to tax the effective exercise of a
testamentary power in circumstances like the present. The only
grounds for the decision were that the intangibles held in trust
in another state, which were the subject of the power, had no situs
in the state where the domiciled testator had exercised the power
by his will; that its exercise was subject to the laws of Massachu-
setts where the will donating the power and establishing the trust
had been probated, and that no 'right' exercised by the donee was
conferred by the state of his domicile where it was exercised. The
conclusion there reached and the reasons advanced in its support
cannot be reconciled with the decision and the reasoning of the
Bullen, the McCanless and the Elliott cases. It is plain that if
appropriate emphasis be placed on the orderly administration of
justice rather than blind adherence to conflicting precedents, the
1062 S. Ct. 870, 86 L. ed. 761 (1942).
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Wachovia case must be overruled. There is no reason why the state
should continue to be deprived of revenue from a subject which
from the beginning has been within reach of its taxing power; a
subject over which we cannot say the state's control has been cur-
tailed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. No
interest which could be served by so rigid an adherence to stare
decisis is superior to the demands of a system of justice based on a
considered and a consistent application of the constitution."
The evils of double taxation around which the citizen is entwined
again recalls the statement made by Calvin Coolidge, while President of
the United States:
"A share of stock represents a most conspicuous example of
multiple inheritance taxation. It is possible that the same share
of stock, upon the death of its owner, may be subject to taxation,
first, by the federal government, then by the state where its owner
was domiciled; then by some other state which may also claim him
as a citizen; again in the state where the certificate of stock was
kept; in the state where the certificate of stock must be transferred
on the corporation's books; in the state or states where is organ-
ized the corporation whose capital stock is involved; and finally, in
the state or states where the corporation owns property.
"All this means not only an actual amount of tax which may,
under particular circumstances, exceed 100 per cent of the value of
the stock, but the expense, delay and inconvenience of getting clear-
ances of the states who claim a right to tax the property is a serious
burden to the heir who is to receive the stock. Particularly is this
expense disproportionate to the tax paid by a small estate which
has but a few shares of stock. In many cases the expense alone
must exceed the total value of the shares which it is sought to
transfer."
Where do all these tax decisions place the citizen today? He is
confronted with the threat of double and possibly triple taxation of his
intangibles upon his death. If a resident of state A dies leaving stock,
the certificates for which are in state B, and the company is incorporated
in state C, his estate faces the possibility of paying three death taxes on
the same property, in addition to the estate tax levied by the federal
government. The citizen faces the possibility of double taxation if he
dies possessed of bonds issued by municipalities of a state other than the
state of domicile, once by the domicilliary state and again by the state
in which the municipalities are located. He cannot be sure that if he
dies siezed of real estate in another state that his estate won't have to pay
a succession tax to the state, in which the real estate is located and a
duplicate tax to his own state which conferred benefits upon him during
his lifetime. Even during his lifetime the citizen must be careful in
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making gifts of corporate stock of corporations organized under a state
other than his own, for fear of encountering a double gift tax in addition
to the federal gift tax. In this connection I wish to call attention to the
wording of Colorado's gift tax statute regarding the applicability of the
tax. Section 2, Chapter 75 A, 1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated,
reads as follows:
"When tax shall apply.--The tax shall apply whether the
transfer is in trust or otherwise, whether the gift is direct or indi-
rect, and whether the property is real or perscnal, tangible or intan-
gible: and shall apply to all transfers of property within this state
or within its jurisdiction whether by residents or non-residents;
and to all transfers by residents of intangible property wherever
situated and of tangible personal property which shall not have
acquired a bona fide permanent situs without this state."
Notice that the law applies to "all transfers of property within this
state or within its jurisdiction whether by residents or non-residents."
In the Aldrich decision 2 0 the Utah statute employed substantially those
words. After indicating that the inheritance tax law applied both to
residents and to non-residents, the Utah act went on to say that "The
value of the gross estate of a decedent shall be determined by including
the value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal, within
the jurisdiction of this state * * *." The court held that shares of a
corporation organized under Utah law were "within its jurisdiction"
for the purpose of a succession tax even though the stock certificates never
were physically present in Utah or even transferred on the books of the
company within the state of Utah.
What if revenue-hungry legislatures, realizing this new source of
income, adopt laws permitting such double or triple taxation of intan-
gibles upon death-what would be the ultimate result upon those states?
It would undermine their fundamental succession tax law as regards resi-
dents, which in most cases is based upon the relationship of the recipient
to the decedent, and in most states is progressive in rates which is predi-
cated upon the ability to pay. It would affect the normal sale of cor-
porate stocks and municipal obligations, by subjecting them to taxation
in one or more states. It would prevent the normal incorporation of
commercial enterprises under state law and would encourage federal in-
corporation or the adoption of a federal law which would permit the
federal government to issue charters to all types of corporate businesses.
It would further complicate the sale of all types of property by reason
of the necessity of reporting to more than one state and obtaining an
inheritance tax clearance before being permitted to make the actual sale.
It would mean that the issuance of life insurance policies would be
2'Supra note 2.
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further entailed when one considers that the state of domicile might tax
it, the state of incorporation might tax it, and the state where the policy
was physically located might tax it, if for example it were held in cus-
tody by a trustee in a third state. But no doubt the most disastrous
effect such taxation laws would have on the states and on its citizens
would be the complete adoption of the present trend toward centraliza-
tion of taxing powers in the federal government, strangling the inherent
right of the sovereign state to tax the property of its own citizens.
What can a state do, whose citizens are opposed to such forms of
double taxation? Of course it can limit its right to tax only the tangi-
bles and intangibles of its resident decedents. But that alone would not
assure its citizens that other states would take the same measures. For
this reason many states adopted so-called reciprocal statutes many years
ago which became obsolete when the United States Supreme Court
adopted the single tax theory. Now that the single tax theory is no
longer the law of the land, many states find that their reciprocal laws are
inadequate or were repealed outright. It is debatable whether legisla-
tures will revert to reciprocal acts or whether they will attempt to tax
the transfer of property on every conceivable theory proposed by the
court. "The power to tax is the power to destroy"-and I believe that
double taxation of intangibles is one of the sure roads toward destruction
of our American system of free enterprise.
Colorado has at present on its statute books a form of reciprocal
law, Section 6, Chapter 85, 1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated, which
reads as follows:
"Transfer by resident.-A tax is hereby imposed under the
conditions and subject to the exemptions and limitations herein-
after prescribed, upon transfers, in trust or otherwise, of the follov -
ing property or any interest therein or income therefrom:
"(a) When the transfer is from a resident of this state-
"1. Real property situated in this state.
"2. Tangible personal property, except such as has an actual
situs without this state.
"3. All intangible personal property, wheresoever the notes,
bonds, stock certificates, or other evidence, if any, thereof, may be
physically located, or the banks or other debtors may be located or
domiciled.
"(b) When the transfer is from a non-resident of this stdte-
"1. Real property situated in this state.
"2. Tangible personal property which has an actual situs in
this state.
"3. Intangibles that have acquired an actual or business
situs in this state; provided, no transfer or succession tax has been
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levied and paid on such transfer at the domicile of the decedent; but
if the transfer of such intangibles shall be taxed at the domicile,
their transfer shall also be deemed taxable by this state unless, prior
to payment of such tax at the domicile, the executor, administrator
or trustee shall notify the Commissioner in writing by registered
mail of intention to make payment at the domicile, such notice
to be sent at least thirty days prior to such payment."
As a matter of fact the inheritance tax department has not at-
tempted to tax intangibles of non-residents located in Colorado if it
appears that a tax has been or will be paid to the state of domicile. In
not one in a hundred cases is notice given by registered mail to the Colo-
rado inheritance tax commissioner thirty days prior to payment of the
tax to the state of domicile. It follows that under a strict interpretation
of the statute an inheritance tax could be levied by Colorado on the trans-
fer of intangibles belonging to non-residents which had acquired an
actual or business situs in this state, in all cases where the estate neglected
to notify the commissioner within the time provided by statute. Usually
the non-resident estate has paid the domicilliary tax before seeking a
Colorado release and of course few are familiar with the peculiar provi-
sions of our statute regarding notice.
So far as encouraging other states to adopt reciprocal legislation,
our statute fails most miserably. This can best be illustrated by a spe-
cific example: Suppose a Utah resident died leaving intangible securities
in a Denver safe deposit box. Upon being advised that Utah had taxed
the transfer, the Colorado inheritance tax department would release the
securities and claim no tax. But, on the other hand, should a Colorado
resident die owning securities of a Utah corporation or intangibles lo-
cated in Utah, the estate would be subject to inheritance taxes by both
Colorado and Utah. In other words, Colorado is in the anomalous
position of being reciprocal with a non-reciprocal state!
The most commonly adopted reciprocal statute is the Uniform Re-
ciprocal Exemption Law, which provides as follows:
"No tax shall be imposed in respect of personal property (ex-
cept tangible personal property having an actual situs in this state),
if
"(a) The transferor at the time of the transfer was a resi-
dent of a state or territory of the United States, or of any foreign
country, which at the time of the transfer did not impose a transfer
tax or- death tax of any character in respect of personal property of
residents of this state (except tangible personal property having an
actual situs in such state or territory or foreign country) , or
"(b) If the laws of the state, territory or country of residence
of the transferor at the time of the transfer contained a reciprocal
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exemption provision under which non-residents were exempted
from transfer taxes or death taxes of every character in respect of
personal property (except tangible personal property having an
actual situs therein), provided the state, territory or country of
residence of such non-resident allowed a similar exemption to resi-
dents of the state, territory or country of residence of such trans-
feror. For the purposes of this section the District of Columbia
and possessions of the United States shall be considered territories
of the United States."
Under this statute the intangibles of a non-resident decedent are
not subject to a succession tax, provided the state of domicile has a simi-
lar reciprocal statute or does not attempt in any manner to tax such
intangibles of non-residents. Complete absence of any succession tax in
the domicilliary state is considered sufficient to invoke the exemptioa
under such a reciprocal act. This means that if the domicilliary state
had no succession tax law, as, for example, the state of Nevada, which
never adopted any type of death tax, and the state where the intangibles
were located or had a business situs provided for reciprocity, then in
that event such intangibles would not be subject to any death tax but
the federal estate tax. In some rare instances, since the case of Curry V.
McCantess, Colorado has collected an inheritance tax on the transfer of
intangibles located here but owned by a non-resident decedent domiciled
in a state which levied no death tax and consequently no tax could be
paid to the domicilliary state which would exempt the securities from
the Colorado tax. Some legislators will want to retain this power to
tax the transfer of intangibles, on any theory, provided the state of dom-
icile claims no tax, arguing that such action does not have the onus of
double taxation. But if it is believed that the state of-domicile should
be the only state to tax intangibles of decedents, regardless of situs, or in
other words, if it is believed that the single tax theory should prevail,
the legislators should not hesitate to adopt full reciprocal statutes.
Simply exempting all intangibles of non-residents from the succession
tax is, in my opinion, not enough. As long as there are states which
insist upon double taxation of intangibles, reciprocal statutes must be
adopted to force public opinion in those states to alter their taxing stat-
utes. It is believed by many tax authorities that the trend toward adop-
tion of reciprocal legislation, regarding the taxation of intangibles, will
return to safeguard the rights of investors who are now in a quandary as
a result of the Aldrich decision. In view of the far reaching position
the court has taken, the only remedy against double death duties is the
adoption of such reciprocal laws by all the states in the interest of na-
tional unity.
